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tariff and nontariff barriers on competing goods. Reforming indirect taxation would however 
generate considerable revenue losses for local governments and, in the absence of any 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, China carried a far-reaching set of fiscal reforms. On the revenue side, it assigned 
some revenues entirely to the central or local governments and introduced sharing of 
revenues for taxes such as the value-added tax (VAT). Thus, 75 percent of the VAT revenue 
was to be assigned to the central government, while the remaining 25 percent of the VAT, as 
well as the business tax, were assigned to local governments.2 
 
At the same time, the system of transfers from the center to local governments was 
redesigned to include an equalization component based on the expenditure needs of each 
province and revenue capacities. However, in order to convince the richer provinces to 
accept the new design, a “revenue-returned mechanism” was introduced, to transfer back 
30 percent of the increase in VAT and excise tax revenue to the originating province. 
 
The VAT in China has the unusual feature that capital goods are included in the VAT base, 
so that the VAT is a production-based (P-VAT), rather than forming a more traditional 
consumption-based VAT (C-VAT). A second notable feature of indirect taxation in China is 
that most services are subject to a turnover tax, known as the business tax, which is not 
creditable against VAT, but which accrues to local governments. These features lead to 
several forms of cascading, distorting the choice of inputs for the production of both goods 
and services and leading to an arbitrary (and unknown) pattern of effective tax rates on 
different consumption items. On the grounds of economic efficiency, it would be desirable to 
eliminate these distortions. 
 
Furthermore, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has placed increased 
urgency on the need to reform the country’s indirect taxation. The current VAT system will 
increasingly place domestic producers at a disadvantage as the country complies with WTO 
requirements and dismantles tariff and nontariff barriers on competing goods. The situation is 
further complicated, as the tax administration only refunds a part of the paid VAT to Chinese 
exporters. 
 
Moving to a C-VAT is a critical reform, but would imply an overall revenue loss, as the 
exclusion of capital goods reduces the tax base. An extension of the VAT to services would 
also imply a revenue loss for local governments that could be offset by the revenue gain at 
the center. The paper also shows that the magnitude of these revenue losses, both absolutely, 
and relative to current VAT revenues, will vary across provinces. Thus the reforms will not 
be easy to implement, unless provinces are compensated for the compounded revenue 
shortfall they will face. 
 
This paper focuses in particular on the extent of revenue losses, their distribution across 
provinces, and possible options for compensation. We present numerical simulations of the 
                                                 
2 See Ahmad, Qiang, and Tanzi (1995). 
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redistribution of tax revenue between individual provinces, and between provinces as a 
whole and the center. In order to make this reform a viable option, the system of transfers 
will need to be simultaneously reformed.3 
II.   A SWITCH TO CONSUMPTION-BASED VAT  
This section investigates the revenue implications of a switch from the current P-VAT to a C-
VAT for the center and local governments, as well as across local governments.4 Simple 
simulations have been run on the basis of 2001 data. Any effect of the tax reforms on the size 
of the relevant tax bases (so-called behavioral responses) have been excluded. Only the 
“first-round” effects of these reforms are reported, and the issue of “revenue-returned” is not 
addressed at this stage. 
 
The revenue raised by VAT is defined as the tax base x tax rate x collection efficiency. The 
simulations presented here illustrate the revenue effects from a change in the VAT tax base 
implied by the reform. A standard VAT rate of 17 percent is assumed here to apply to 
changes in the base. For the collection efficiency, an upper bound of 100 percent and a lower 
bound of 50 percent are assumed. This parameter measures not only tax evasion by 
enterprises, or failure by the tax administration to collect tax due, but also the application of 
the lower (13 percent) rate of VAT to some sectors, and lower rates of VAT, or even 
exemption, for smaller enterprises.  
 
Base scenario 
 
The first step is to construct an estimate of purchases of capital inputs by taxable enterprises. 
In principle, under a C-VAT, VAT on purchases of all capital inputs, including buildings, 
should be creditable. However, in China, construction as a service is taxed under the business 
tax. So, for VAT purposes, it is a VAT-exempt sector, and the VAT paid on building 
materials embedded in buildings would not be creditable. Thus, the current simulations focus 
only on the impact of allowing VAT credits of machinery and equipment (M&E). This will 
in general produce an underestimate of the losses in tax revenue to provinces, but will 
approximate the relative losses across provinces (i.e., the changes in horizontal imbalances) 
due to this possible reform. Table 1 presents the result of these calculations. 
 
The first two columns give the value of output of the sectors of the provincial economies 
liable for VAT, based on China’s national income accounts classification. These include 
secondary industry excluding construction, and commerce (wholesale, retail, and catering).5 
 
                                                 
3 Ahmad, Singh, and Fortuna (2004). 
4 The simulations presented here use available published data from the China Statistical Yearbook. 
5 This is based on the fact that the exempt sectors comprise the primary sector (agriculture), the construction 
sector, and all services, and government sectors except for commerce.  
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Next, using the relevant coefficients from the latest available (1997) input-output table, we 
construct an estimate of the purchases of M&E by taxable sectors in each province. These 
estimates are reported in the third column of the table.6  
 
The revenue shortfall implied by a move to a C-VAT for each province can now be 
calculated. The results are presented in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1: (i) given the 
current rate of VAT of 17 percent on purchases of M&E; (ii) assuming that the existing 
revenue-sharing rule of 25 percent of VAT revenue-returned to the provinces is in place; and 
(iii) ignoring the operation of the revenue-returned formula. The results expressed 
as percentages of the current VAT revenue received by provinces in 2001 are given in the 
sixth and seventh columns.  
 
There is considerable variation of percentage losses across provinces, as indicated by a 
coefficient of variation of about 0.31. The cause of this variation stems from the different 
extent to which the provinces rely on secondary industry; the more important this is for a 
province, the more it stands to lose from this reform. In the case of 100 percent efficiency in 
revenue collection, the average loss across provinces is about 30 percent, with some peaks 
(e.g., 54 percent of revenue from the VAT in Hebei). For a lower collection efficiency,  the 
average loss across provinces drops by half, with the loss below 10 percent of current VAT 
revenue for Beijing, Shanghai, and Tibet, where manufacturing is relatively unimportant. 
Are poorer provinces more affected by a move to a C-VAT? The scatter diagram presented in 
Figure 1 suggests a rough inverted “U” shape relationship between regional GDP per capita 
and the percentage in revenue loss. Both lower-income provinces (as they rely more on 
agriculture) and higher-income provinces (such as Beijing and Shanghai, which rely more on 
services) would seem to lose less than middle-income provinces.7 
 
What would be the effect on the finances of the central government? Our estimate of the 
reduction in central government’s 75 percent share of VAT revenue implied by the move to 
the C-VAT is between Y 62.8 billion and Y 125.6 billion, depending on what is assumed 
about collection efficiency. For comparison, in 2001, total VAT revenue was about 
Y 536 billion, of which central government’s share was Y 402 billion.  
                                                 
6 In the 1997 input-output table, input-output coefficients are reported for all the components of secondary 
industry separately (mining and quarrying, foodstuffs, textiles, other manufacturing, electric power steam and 
hot water, gas and petroleum, chemicals, building materials and non-metal products, metal products, and 
machinery and equipment). We calculate the unweighted average of these coefficients, and then apply this 
average to the figure for secondary industry minus construction. Note that provincial input-output tables were 
not available and there may be differences in the coefficients across provinces. Thus, the estimates above should 
be seen as rough approximations, or illustrations of method. 
7 Figure 1 shows the more realistic case of 50 percent collection efficiency, but the picture is similar in the other 
polar case of 100 percent collection efficiency.  Note also that three outlying provinces are responsible for the 
inverted U-shape. If these provinces are excluded, the richer provinces would be seen to lose more than the 
poorer ones. 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; and authors’ calculations. 
 
Revised sharing rule scenario 
 
One possible option to compensate provinces for their revenue shortfall would be to increase 
the share of VAT revenue assigned to local governments. In this case, the share of revenue-
returned to the provinces increased from the current 25 percent up to the point where the 
aggregate provincial VAT returns to its initial level (i.e., revenue-neutrality for provinces 
only). The first step is to calculate the increase in the VAT share required to achieve this 
objective. This is shown in the first column of Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Revised VAT Revenue-Sharing Rules 
 Revenue-Neutral VAT Share for Provinces 
(In percent) 
 
Revenue Loss of Central 
Government 
(In billions of yuan) 
Revenue Loss of Central 
Government as Percent 
of 2001 VAT Revenue 
Low collection efficiency 
(50 percent) 
29.6 114.17 28.4 
High collection efficiency 
(100 percent) 
36.3 142.67 35.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 1. Provincial Percentage Revenue Losses from C-VAT Reform, 
Base Scenario
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The increase in the provincial VAT sharing rate needed for overall revenue-neutrality would 
depend on the efficiency in the VAT collection.8 However, the difference would not seem to 
be large. At the lower bound of 50 percent efficiency, the sharing rate would need to rise 
to 29.6 percent from the current 25 percent, while at the upper bound of 100 percent 
efficiency, the rate would need to rise to 36.3 percent.  
 
However, as Table 2 indicates, the budgetary consequences for central government of this 
option are quite severe, as it must share a larger proportion of a smaller pool of VAT revenue 
with provincial governments. For both levels of collection efficiency considered in this 
exercise, the central government would lose about one-third of its current VAT revenue if it 
fully compensated the provinces for the reform. 
 
Given these revised sharing rates, one can then calculate the change in revenue on a 
province-by-province basis given the switch to the C-VAT and the offsetting rate rise. These 
changes are shown in Table 3 below. As might be expected, less industrialized provinces 
gain (i.e., which rely more either on agriculture or services), whereas those where secondary 
industry is important lose most.  
 
Clearly, some poorer provinces such as Tibet and Guizhou gain because of their reliance on 
agriculture. On the other hand, cities such as Beijing and Shanghai also gain. Overall, the 
correlation between GDP per capita and gains from the reform is strongly positive (a 
correlation coefficient of 0.623 in the 50 percent efficiency case, and of 0.548 in the 
100 percent efficiency case). Hence, a higher VAT sharing rule would not appropriately 
target resource-constrained provinces and could result in making the move to C-VAT 
strongly disequalizing.  
 
Raising the standard rate of VAT 
 
An alternative option would be to compensate provinces by raising the standard rate of VAT 
from 17 percent to make the reform revenue-neutral (i.e., to leave aggregate VAT revenue 
unchanged). If the rate rise is revenue-neutral for the provinces in aggregate, it would also be 
revenue-neutral for the central government. However, the problem is that quite sharp 
increases in the standard rate would be needed, as Table 4 shows. 
 
Increasing VAT rates to this extent could have undesirable macroeconomic and incentive 
effects on the economy, for example by raising prices and decreasing consumption demand. 
The fact that “second-round” effects are not taken into account in these simulations is a 
serious limitation, as a sharp increase in the VAT rate would certainly imply changes in 
behavior, reducing the VAT base significantly in the short run.  
 
                                                 
8 Generally,  the formula is that the new rate (as a fraction),  is equal to 0.25 times 134.17/(134.17-X), where 
X is the revenue gain/loss in billion of yuan as given in Table 3, so X = 20.94 or 41.87.  
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Table 4. Revised Standard Rate of VAT 
 
Revenue-Neutral 
Standard VAT Rate for 
Provinces 
 (In percent) 
Revenue Loss of Central 
Government  
(In billions of yuan) 
Revenue Loss of Central 
Government as Percent 
of 2001 VAT Revenue 
Low collection efficiency 
(50 percent) 20.1 0 0 
High collection efficiency 
(100 percent) 
24.7 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
III.   EXTENSION OF THE VAT TO SERVICES 
The extension of the VAT to services is an important complement of the tax reforms and 
should largely offset losses associated with the C-VAT. However, since services are already 
subject to the business tax, the latter would be replaced as part of the reforms. The difficulty 
is that the business tax accrues entirely to local governments, whereas the VAT would 
presumably be shared. We estimate the magnitude of these distributional effects. 
 
Base scenario 
 
We first calculate the addition to the VAT base implied by the taxation of services. For this 
purpose, we will assume that all services which were previously taxed by the business tax 
will be subject to VAT, with the exception of finance and insurance.9 It is well known that 
transactions in this sector are hard to tax under a value-added tax, as the share of value-added 
between borrower and lender is hard to determine.10 We also assume that the business tax at 
the current rate continues to apply to the finance and insurance sector. The results are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 5.11 
 
However, in moving to a VAT on services, there will be a loss of revenue stemming from the 
removal of cascading. This is, in a sense, the revenue cost of removing the economic 
distortions associated with cascading, as discussed above. We approximate this revenue loss 
                                                 
9 In 2001, the financial and insurance sectors accounted for 28 percent of the business tax proceeds. 
10 Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and Summers (2001). 
11 In terms of the Chinese classification of national income, the service sectors added to the VAT base are: 
services to farming, forestry and fishery, geological prospecting and water conservancy, transport, storage, post 
and telecommunications services, real estate, other; and one-third of: social services, health care, sports and 
social welfare; education, culture, arts, radio, film and television; scientific research and polytechnic services. 
 - 11 - 
 
by calculating the value of purchases by sectors already liable for VAT (in terms of the 
Chinese classification of national income, these are secondary industry and commerce) from 
sectors to which VAT is assumed to be extended. The VAT paid on these purchases will 
now be creditable, and thus these purchases are lost from the VAT base. The results of this 
calculation are presented in Column 2 of Table 5. The net increase (Column 3) is the 
difference between the figures in Columns 1 and  2. The next step is to calculate the implied 
gain in VAT revenue. This is done in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5, assuming 100 percent and 
50 percent collection efficiencies, respectively.  
 
The final step is to compare this to the revenue lost by the provinces from the abolition of the 
business tax. We have assumed that the business tax would remain for the financial and 
insurance sectors. The relative size of these sectors differs however widely by region.  
 
In 2001, they provided about 15 percent of provincial GDP in Beijing, but only about 
0.9 percent of GDP in Heilongjiang. To calculate how much each province would lose from 
the abolition of the business tax except on this sector, we assume that the province retains a 
share  of its business tax revenue, where (i) ai is proportional to the share of finance and 
insurance in regional GDP; and (ii) overall, 28 percent of business tax revenue is retained. 
 
The formula for ai can be calculated,12 and this allows us to calculate the amount (1-ai) times 
actual business tax revenue in province i, which is the amount presumed to be lost. This is 
shown by province in Column 6 of Table 5. The overall gain from this reform is then the 
increase in VAT revenue (calculated at 100 percent or 50 percent VAT efficiency) minus the 
calculated loss of revenue from the business tax. This is shown in Columns 7 and 8 of 
Table 5.  
 
The pattern of gains and losses across provinces is complex, as several factors are at work. 
First, other things being equal, provinces that have a large service sector, but where finance 
and insurance is relatively unimportant, will tend to lose most, as they lose all their revenue 
from the business tax on these activities. By the same token, provinces where finance and 
insurance is important will tend to lose less or gain, as their business tax revenue from these 
activities is not lost. Additional insight can be obtained from looking at how (percentage) 
losses vary across provinces by GDP per capita. This is shown in Figure 2 below.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Let Ri denote the business tax revenue in province i. Then (i) states that ai = λsi for province i, where si is the 
share of insurance and finance in province i, and (ii) states that ∑ ∑=i i iii RRa 28.0 . Solving these 
equations for  λ, and substituting back in relationship (i),  
we get ∑
∑=
i i
i ii
ii R
Rs
sa /28.0 .  
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No clear pattern clearly emerges from Figure 2. If one ignores the “outliers” of Beijing and 
Shanghai, which do well because the revenue from the business tax on finance and insurance 
is protected, the reform seems however to be mildly equalizing as middle-income provinces 
do a little worse on average than lower-income ones. However, on its own, this is not a 
reform that would win much support among provinces. 
 
 
Note: The figure assumes 50 percent collection efficiency. 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; and and authors’ calculations. 
On the other hand, the central government gains considerably from the reform. Given that 
central government gets 75 percent of VAT, it gets three times the additional revenue from 
the VAT services accruing to the provinces (i.e., three times between Y 44 billion and 
Y 88 billion, or Y 132 billion and Y 264 billion). Thus, the center has the capacity of 
redistributing the additional sums to provinces for equalization, or even increasing the 
revenue share in favour of local governments. The latter option is discussed next. 
 
Revised sharing rule scenario 
 
As previously with the C-VAT reform, we could increase the VAT sharing rate from 
25 percent to make the reform revenue-neutral for provinces in the aggregate. The sharing 
rate that does this is the share of post-reform VAT revenue that makes overall (i.e., national) 
tax revenue from VAT and the business tax equal to revenue from VAT and the business tax 
in 2001. This new share is approximately 0.30 if the VAT is collected very efficiently 
Figure 2. Provincial Losses from Extension of VAT to Services, Base Scenario 
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(100 percent) and 0.37 if the VAT is collected less efficiently (50 percent). Given these new 
sharing rules, one can calculate the gains and losses from this revenue-neutral (for the 
provinces) reform. This is given in Table 6 below. 
 
The first column in Table 6 provides 2001 revenue from the VAT and business tax by 
province. The second and third columns give total revenue from VAT under the new reform, 
where the new sharing rule has been applied to the new VAT base to make the reform 
revenue-neutral. Columns 4 and 5 give the monetary gains or losses from this revenue-
neutral reform, given the two extreme assumptions about efficiency. Columns 6 and 7 give 
these same gains and losses in percentage form. As before, it is not clear that the benefits or 
losses fall predominantly on poorer or richer provinces and an increase in the general sharing 
rule would not appropriately target the provinces facing a revenue shortfall. 
IV.   THE REVENUE-RETURNED SYSTEM   
In addition to the direct sharing of VAT revenue, the revenue-returned formula (RR) returns 
an additional portion of VAT and consumption tax revenues to provinces. According to this 
mechanism, 30 percent of the increase in VAT and consumption tax collection over their 
1994 base is returned to the originating province. Viewed as elements of the transfer system, 
both of these are regressive as they both tend to benefit richer provinces. We discuss here 
features of the revenue-returned formula and its interactions with the tax VAT reforms 
discussed in Sections II and III.  
 
The dynamics of RR 
 
First, our analysis suggests that the revenue-returned formula does not operate uniformly 
across provinces. Suppose that both province A and province B receive an additional 
1 million yuan in VAT or consumption tax revenue. The amount passed back to province A 
will generally be different to that passed back to province B via the revenue-returned 
formula. This would not be a problem if this feature had been designed into the formula in a 
rational way, with the clear objective of helping poorer provinces, or those with the greatest 
gap between expenditure needs and revenue capacity. However, this is not the case and the 
differences in treatment of the provinces seem largely arbitrary.  
 
The revenue-returned formula written out in full, states that: 
 








+
−+−+=
−−
−−
−
1,1,
1,,1,,
1,, 3.01
titi
titititi
titi CTVAT
CTCTVATVAT
RRRR     (1) 
where: 
 tiRR ,  - revenue-returned to province i at year t 
 tiVAT ,  - VAT revenue collected in province i at year t 
 tiCT ,  - CT revenue collected in province i at year t 
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That is, this year’s revenue-returned is equal to last year’s, times last year’s return times 
0.3 times the growth rate of the sum of VAT and consumption tax revenues for that province. 
As stated here, the formula tracks actual revenue-returned quite well in the recent past, as 
Table 7 indicates.  
 
 
Table 7. Returned-Revenue, 1996–2001 
 
(In billions of yuan) 
 
       
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
              
       
Excises 62.0 67.4 81.5 82.0 85.729 92.946 
VAT 296.3 327.9 362.8 387.8 455.251 535.622 
Total collection 358.3 395.3 444.3 469.9 541.0 628.6 
       
RR actual 194.9 201.2 208.3 216.73 228.2 234 
RR formula  200.9 208.7 211.9 226.6 239.3 
       
In percent of total collection 
       
RR formula  50.8 47.0 45.1 41.9 38.1 
RR actual  50.9 46.9 46.1 42.2 37.2 
              
 
  Sources: Ministry of finance; and authors’ estimates.     
 
 
From (1), an increment ∆ in either VAT or consumption tax revenue in year t will lead to the 
following change in revenue-returned to province i in that year: 
 
∆+=∆ −−
−
1,1,
1,
, 3.0
titi
ti
ti CTVAT
RR
RR        (2) 
 
From (2), it is clear that the share of any increase in VAT or consumption tax revenue in the 
current year t returned to the province via the revenue-returned formula is simply  
 
1,1,
1,3.0
−−
−
+ titi
ti
CTVAT
RR
        (3) 
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We call this the incremental tax share.13 From equation (3) it is clear that this incremental 
tax share may in principle differ across provinces. In particular, a province’s share will be 
higher (i) the higher last year’s revenue-returned; (ii) the lower last year’s VAT and 
consumption taxes collected.  
 
In practice, one may enquire as to how important are these differences? We do not have all 
the data to compute these incremental tax shares exactly for a given year, but have enough 
information to reasonably approximate them. These calculations are given below in Table 8, 
for the year 2001 using formula (3). While the provincial revenues from VAT are available 
for 2000, the provincial distribution of aggregate revenue-returned is based on 1998 data—
the most recent date for which these data were available—scaled up by the growth in actual  
revenue-returned. The distribution of consumption tax revenues collected by provinces is 
also inferred on the basis of VAT collection. In spite of these approximations, the picture is 
reasonably clear. There is considerable variation with an incremental tax share of only about 
8 percent in Heilongjiang, but about 28 percent returned in Yunnan.  
 
How does the revenue return system compare to the simple sharing of VAT and consumption 
tax revenues? A major disadvantage of the revenue-returned formula relative to simple 
sharing is that it is not transparent. In particular, the differences across regions are driven by 
past history and not necessarily by the current or revenue capacities’ needs or revenue 
capacities of provinces. In fact, as shown in Figure 3 below, the sharing rates are mildly 
equalizing, in that some richer regions tend to get smaller shares, although this tendency is 
not uniform.  
 
Nevertheless, the revenue-returned formula does have a potentially significant advantage 
over a sharing rule. Viewed as a transfer, a simple sharing rule is permanently disequalizing, 
in that richer provinces, which generate more tax revenues, will always get more revenue-
returned to them than poor provinces. On the other hand, the revenue-returned formula is 
only temporarily disequalizing. In the long run, the revenue-returned as a proportion of tax 
revenue will tend to zero. This is clear from formula (1), because revenue-returned only 
grows a third as fast as VAT and consumption tax revenue. 
 
The extent of this advantage depends on how fast tax revenues grow. For example, suppose 
that all tax revenues are growing at 10 percent a year (not an unreasonable assumption for 
China). Then it would take over a decade for revenue-returned to become half as important 
for tax revenue as it was in 2001. More generally, if all taxes are growing at some common 
rate g, we have in Table 9 the “half-life” of the formula. Thus, it would take decades for the 
RR to fall by half should revenue growth slow down. The advantage of the revenue-retuned 
formula as declining over time should therefore not be oversold. 
                                                 
13 Of course, when the VAT share of 25 percent is included, a province receives 25 percent plus the incremental 
tax share. 
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Table 8. Incremental Tax Shares by Region, 2001 
 
Region  
Revenue-returned, 
2000 1/ 
(1) 
Total VAT Collected, 
2000 
(2) 
Total Consumption 
Tax Collected, 
2000 2/ 
(3) 
Incremental Share, 
2001 3/ 
   (In billions of yuan) (In percent) 
       
Beijing  8.37 18.38 3.45 11.50 
 Tianjin   5.16 10.45 1.96 12.48 
 Hebei   9.05 17.48 3.28 13.08 
 Shanxi   4.72 10.21 1.92 11.67 
 Inner Mongolia  3.43 5.35 1.01 16.16 
 Liaoning   13.16 22.68 4.26 14.65 
 Jilin   5.14 8.16 1.53 15.91 
 Heilongjiang   6.36 18.45 3.47 8.70 
 Shanghai   18.48 37.42 7.03 12.47 
 Jiangsu   17.15 43.46 8.17 9.97 
 Zhejiang   12.93 36.01 6.77 9.07 
 Anhui   6.02 10.50 1.97 14.48 
 Fujian   6.30 14.14 2.66 11.25 
 Jiangxi   3.68 6.03 1.13 15.42 
 Shandong   13.17 35.88 6.74 9.27 
 Henan   9.56 16.90 3.18 14.29 
 Hubei   8.12 13.51 2.54 15.18 
 Hunan   8.49 10.44 1.96 20.53 
 Guangdong   20.06 52.85 9.93 9.59 
 Guangxi   5.57 8.26 1.55 17.03 
 Hainan   0.69 1.14 0.21 15.35 
 Sichuan   8.35 13.54 2.54 15.59 
 Chongqing   3.61 5.91 1.11 15.44 
 Guizhou   4.00 4.87 0.92 20.74 
 Yunnan   14.17 12.55 2.36 28.51 
 Tibet   0.19 0.32 0.06 15.43 
 Shaanxi   4.29 7.60 1.43 14.26 
 Gansu   4.27 4.78 0.90 22.54 
 Qinghai   0.71 1.19 0.22 14.96 
 Ningxia   0.72 1.42 0.27 12.76 
 Xinjiang   2.29 6.11 1.15 9.47 
 Totals  228.20 455.99 85.70  
Average     14.44 
 
  Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; and and authors’ calculations. 
 
  1/ Provincial shares of total based on 1998 data.  
  2/ Provincial shares of aggregate consumption tax collected assumed the same as for VAT.  
  3/ Incremental tax share = 0.3 times column 1 divided by Column 2 and Column 3. 
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Table 9. The “Half-Life” of the Revenue-Returned Formula 
 
Growth Rate of Rax Revenues, g Number of Years for Revenue-returned as a Proportion of Tax Revenue to Fall by Half 
0.05 20.45 
0.10 10.54 
0.15  7.24 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
1/ Includes 25 percent VAT share. 
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Including RR in the C-VAT reform  
 
The simulations presented in Section II on the introduction of the C-VAT ignored the 
operation of the revenue-returned formula. It is in fact, quite difficult to incorporate the effect 
of this formula, as it seems to be applied asymmetrically. The formula is generally only 
applied in the case it leads to an overall increase the revenue-returned to a province relative 
to the previous year. As the move to a C-VAT would clearly reduce revenue, two 
possibilities could be considered:   
 
Figure 3. Incremental VAT Shares by Province 1/ 
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1. No change in revenue-returned.  If the C-VAT reform takes place in a period of 
weaker economic growth so that VAT revenue and consumption tax revenue together 
show negative growth when the reform is taken into account, then the “overall 
increase” constraint is binding.  
2. Change in revenue-returned. If the C-VAT reform takes place in a period of strong 
economic growth so that VAT revenue and consumption tax revenue together show 
positive growth in spite of the reform, then the “overall increase” constraint is not 
binding.  
If the first scenario holds, the losses already calculated apply—there is no need for further 
calculation, as the decrease in VAT leads to no decrease in revenue-returned. In the second 
scenario, we need also to calculate the additional losses to the provinces arising from the 
reduction in revenue-returned.  
These calculations are given in Table 10 below. The first three columns of this table are 
identical to those in Table 1. Instead of applying the 25 percent sharing rule to column three 
to calculate the loss of VAT  revenue, we apply 25 percent plus the incremental tax shares of 
Table 8. This captures the fact that when the VAT base falls, there is a fall in revenue-
returned. The loss of VAT revenue can again be expressed in percentage terms, which is 
done in the last column of the table. For illustrative purpose, we have only considered here 
the case of 50 percent collection efficiency. On average, the percentage losses are up by 
about 5 percentage points, from an average of 15.40 percent to 20.07 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: China Statistiscal Yearbook; and authors’ calculations 
Figure 4. Provincial Revenue Losses from C-VAT Reform, 
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Would the inclusion of the revenue-returned formula change the distribution of losses across 
provinces? Figure 4 shows that with the revenue-returned there is a more pronounced 
inverted “U” shape relationship between percentage losses and per capita income of 
provinces than in the simple base scenario. Extending our analysis to include the RR formula 
would thus only reinforce the conclusions of Section II. 
 
Table 10. C-VAT Reform Base Scenario Allowing for Revenue-Returned 
(In hundreds of millions of yuan) 
 
Region 
2001 
Value of 
Wholesale, 
Retail and 
Catering 
Trade 
2001 
Value of 
Secondary 
Industry 
(excluding 
construction) 
Calculated 
Purchases 
of M&E 
Incremental 
Tax Shares 
Loss of 
VAT 
Revenue 
(50 percent 
CE) 
2001VAT 
Revenue 
Revenue Loss 
as Percent of 
Initial VAT 
Revenue 
(50 percent 
CE) 
  Beijing        23.78 81.62 19.03 36.50 0.59 5.90 10.01 
  Tianjin        17.83 82.12 18.64 37.48 0.59 3.49 17.03 
  Hebei          50.17 243.96 55.15 38.08 1.78 4.88 36.54 
  Shanxi         14.60 77.98 17.51 36.67 0.55 3.09 17.68 
  Inner Mongolia 14.82 50.67 11.82 41.16 0.41 1.48 27.87 
  Liaoning       69.65 219.01 51.55 39.65 1.74 6.65 26.12 
  Jilin          26.74 72.47 17.37 40.91 0.60 2.42 24.95 
  Heilongjiang   35.02 176.78 39.85 33.70 1.14 5.26 21.72 
  Shanghai       55.04 212.12 48.90 37.47 1.56 11.20 13.91 
  Jiangsu        95.51 427.09 97.19 34.97 2.89 13.20 21.88 
  Zhejiang       90.88 310.63 72.46 34.07 2.10 10.24 20.49 
  Anhui          34.08 119.16 27.73 39.48 0.93 2.83 32.91 
  Fujian         41.15 164.53 37.80 36.25 1.16 4.08 28.56 
  Jiangxi        19.21 59.56 14.04 40.42 0.48 1.72 27.99 
  Shandong       89.13 409.22 92.93 34.27 2.71 10.03 26.99 
  Henan          42.21 227.99 51.15 39.29 1.71 4.44 38.51 
  Hubei          47.34 206.65 47.12 40.18 1.61 3.71 43.34 
  Hunan          38.24 130.95 30.54 45.53 1.18 2.94 40.23 
  Guangdong      104.44 473.24 107.58 34.59 3.16 17.25 18.34 
  Guangxi        29.52 64.82 16.00 42.03 0.57 2.39 23.95 
  Hainan         7.26 7.16 2.10 40.35 0.07 0.35 20.46 
  Chongqing      16.78 57.66 13.44 40.59 0.46 1.78 26.11 
  Sichuan        47.48 140.78 33.36 40.44 1.15 3.80 30.17 
  Guizhou        8.41 33.50 7.70 45.74 0.30 1.43 20.99 
  Yunnan         20.22 72.40 16.81 53.51 0.76 3.36 22.74 
  Tibet          1.66 1.08 0.36 40.43 0.01 0.08 14.74 
  Shaanxi        12.47 60.61 13.70 39.26 0.46 2.33 19.60 
  Gansu          12.30 35.65 8.47 47.54 0.34 1.34 25.60 
  Qinghai        2.31 8.92 2.06 39.96 0.07 0.39 18.14 
  Ningxia        2.35 10.22 2.33 37.76 0.07 0.39 19.42 
  Xinjiang       12.82 45.00 10.47 34.47 0.31 1.74 17.64 
Totals     31.48 134.17  
Averages       24.34 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; and authors’ calculations. 
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V.   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
This paper illustrates that reforming indirect taxation would generate considerable revenue 
losses for local governments. The move to a C-VAT would exclude capital goods from the 
tax base, and also generate losses for the central government. Extending the coverage of the 
VAT to services would lead to substantial revenue gains to the center, but would imply the 
elimination of the business tax on most services, an important source of revenue for local 
governments. In the absence of any compensatory mechanism, there would therefore be little 
chance that these reforms would be carried out.  
A second objective of this paper is to study the distributional impact of the revenue-retuned 
grant formula. Although technically part of the transfer system, rather than a tax, the 
revenue-returned interacts with indirect taxes as it is specifically designed to reallocate 
centrally collected tax revenues back to the provinces. We find that the revenue-returned 
formula is not transparent and differentiates between regions in an arbitrary way. Second, 
while it is designed to grow less rapidly than VAT and consumption tax revenue, it may take 
decades for it to really shrink in importance, especially if economic growth slows. In 
contrast, simple sharing of VAT revenue is transparent and uniform across regions. However, 
it has the disadvantage that it is permanently disequalizing. 
 
This paper discusses several options for compensation. However, it turns out that the reforms 
considered here do not affect all the provinces uniformly. The move to a C-VAT for instance 
would particularly affect provinces where industry represents a large share of their economic 
activity. Poorer provinces, where agriculture is still predominant, and richer provinces, where 
services have taken a growing role, would be less affected. 
Compensating the provinces for their revenue shortfall by changing some parameters of the 
current system would thus not be effective. In the case of a move to a C-VAT, local 
governments could be compensated by either a larger share in the VAT revenue sharing or by 
increasing the standard VAT rate. However, both changes would not adequately target the 
provinces facing a revenue shortfall and would add to the regressivity of the current system: 
wealthier provinces generate more VAT revenue per capita and would receive the largest 
share of the compensation. Including, if the revenue-returned mechanism in the analysis does 
not change the results. 
A more drastic move away from the current system may be called for. Such an option could 
be to extend the equalization grants introduced in 1994. The 1994 fiscal reforms correctly 
designed an equalization transfer system, based on expenditure needs and revenue capacities. 
However, the resources subsequently available to the system were inadequate to make any 
significant equalization impact. In such a mechanism, any change in the capacity of a 
province to mobilize revenue would be picked up in the formula and the amount of transfers 
modified accordingly. A more targeted compensation system could hence be provided, 
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adequately compensating the provinces facing a revenue shortfall stemming from a tax 
reform. 14 
This redesigned transfer system would have the potential to achieve more effective 
redistribution, but it could probably not do so in isolation. Other measures would be needed 
to convince richer provinces to renounce their revenue-returned and accept a more 
redistributive system. Such a comprehensive reform package would include a joint 
reassessment of expenditure responsibilities together with revamped revenue assignments, as 
well as more transparent access to capital markets 
 
Currently, almost all tax rates and bases are nationally set, even for those taxes from which 
the revenue goes entirely to local governments. Tax reforms are needed to provide provinces 
and counties with some control over rates of assigned taxes at the margin. This is a key 
element of fiscal accountability. The choice of taxes, where some local control is envisaged, 
should be such as not to lead to excessive economic distortions and tax competition.  
 
There are strong arguments for standardizing the base for the personal income tax. However, 
bounded control over a number of percentage points for provinces (piggybacking) should 
provide them with much greater room for maneuver than at present. Such reforms will also 
provide significant revenues to the more advanced coastal provinces, thereby reducing the 
political pressures for returning revenue. More extensive use of property taxes at the county-
level, including enhanced valuation and recording mechanisms for leasehold properties, and 
basing annual taxes on the annual lease value equivalent should also be considered. 
 
On the spending side, sub-national expenditure assignments are incommensurate with their 
available resources. Even some middle-income counties face difficulties in meeting pension 
liabilities, and unfunded mandates from the center continue to pose difficulties, including for 
key priority issues such as basic education or health care. The recentralization of pension 
liabilities and unemployment insurance should be considered. 
 
The reforms described above form part of an extensive and interlocking package of measures 
that will take several years to implement fully. China clearly cannot move on all these fronts 
simultaneously and rapidly. While the pace of the reforms may be gradual, the scope should 
be comprehensive. The design of the ultimate overall reform package should be consistent, 
and it will be important to keep this medium-term goal in sight. 
 
                                                 
14 This option is discussed in much greater detail in Ahmad, Singh, and Fortuna (2004). 
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